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WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE: 
A HAPPY MARRIAGE OR PREPARING FOR DIVORCE 
 
This paper is written as a reappraisal of the work on inflation and wage bargaining of Ezio Tarantelli, the Italian 
economist who in 1985 was brutally killed by the Red Brigades. It returns to his ideas, and the discussion within 
the OECD, about combating inflation and free collective bargaining, as well as the relationship between 
corporatism and macroeconomic performance. After a critical review of Tarantelli’s contribution, the paper 
reviews five critical institutional characteristics of wage formation in fourteen European countries and evaluates 
changes that have happened between 1980 and 2003. The key question is whether there is a new institutional 
compromise in the field of collective bargaining over wages, mixing the advantages of coordination and 
decentralisation, and whether that “marriage of opposite’, as it was called by Tarantelli, can be stable or is 
foreboding a further disintegration of coordinating wage bargaining. 
 
 
INSTITUTIES VOOR LOONVORMING IN EUROPA: 
EEN GELUKKIG HUWELIJK OF OP WEG NAAR EEN SCHEIDING? 
 
Dit paper werd geschreven als een terugblik op de bijdrage aan onderzoek en beleid over inflatie en loonvorming 
van de Italiaanse econoom Ezio Tarantelli, die in 1985 op brute wijze door de Rode Brigades werd vermoord. 
Het paper staat om te beginnen stil bij zijn ideeën en bij de discussie binnen de OECD over inflatiebestrijding en 
vrije loonvorming, alsmede de relatie tussen corporatisme en macro-economische uitkomsten. Na een kritische 
beschouwing van Tarantelli’s bijdrage, geeft het paper een overzicht van vijf cruciale institutionele kenmerken van  
arbeidsvoorwaardenvorming in veertien Europese landen tussen 1980 en 2003. De centrale vraag is of er een 
nieuw institutioneel compromis - een mengvorm van coördinatie en decentralisatie – is ontstaan en of dit 
“huwelijk van tegengestelden”, zoals het door Tarantelli werd genoemd, duurzaam zal blijken of het begin van 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1980, in the wake of the second oil crisis, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development organized a special meeting with trade union officials to discuss two issues about which there 
was strong disagreement: fighting inflation and free collective bargaining. According to the OECD experts, 
combating inflation “calls for tight fiscal and non-accommodating policies, notwithstanding the high level of 
unemployment persisting in a number of countries even before the second oil price shock”.  They are 
confident that “the resulting worsening of unemployment will be temporary – a side effect of restrictive 
policies, not their objective (p.4)”. 1 The union officials agree that inflation needs to be fought, but reject the 
deflationary cure proposed by the OECD as “unnecessarily costly, inefficient and indirect (p.5)”. Instead they 
advocate competition in energy markets and pressure on the OPEC cartel. It seems to me that history has 
proven the unions right and the OECD experts wrong: the worsening of unemployment resulting from 
restrictive policies will be far from temporary, develop into long-term unemployment for many, or withdrawal 
from the labour market, two developments which proof extremely hard to reverse even twenty years later.  
 
The issue of free collective bargaining also divided the discussants. There is agreement that the stagflation of 
the 1970s – the combination of rising inflation and rising unemployment – had narrowed the space for free 
collective bargaining and compelled many governments to intervene in wage setting. Both direct and indirect 
state intervention in wage negotiations – the first by suspending negotiations, imposing a freeze or ceilings; the 
second by participating in negotiations (‘tripartism’) and sponsoring central coordination – reached a peak in 
the late 1970s (Chart 1). The participants feared that “genuinely free collective bargaining could be limited to 
‘fair weather’ periods (p.17)”. The OECD policy makers believe, however, that after restrictive policies will 
have delivered lower inflationary expectations, and “with more slack in the labour market”, union demands 
will be more subdued and “therefore lessening the potential conflict between bargaining and economic policy 
(p.18).” On this point, history will proof the OECD experts right: the non-accommodating monetary policies 
of the 1980s and 1990s, resulting in significantly higher levels of unemployment, forced wage restraint on 
union and thus prepared the conditions for a return to ‘free’ wage bargaining.  
Yet, as can be seen from Chart 1, state intervention, in particular in the indirect form, did not disappear and in 
                                                  
1 Report of the meeting of trade union experts and OECD experts from the Economics and Statistics Department and 
Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education, 30th June – 2nd July 1980, Paris: OECD, mimeo, p. 4. Jelle Visser 
the context of preparing the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe tripartism and state-sponsored 
coordination became used in many countries. But had tripartism generally been seen as having failed in the late 
1970s – examples can be cited from Italy and Britain (Regini, 1984), Ireland (Hardiman, 1988), and Belgium and 
the Netherlands (van Ruysseveld and Visser, 1996), – it appeared more promising twenty years later. What 
was rarely effective in the 1970s or early 1980s – a central wage norm or incomes policy guideline in a less 
than fully centralised system of wage bargaining – became apparently feasible in the 1990s: soft coordination 
takes over from hard centralisation, or so it seemed in many of the New Social Pacts (Fajertag and Pochet, 
2000). The ‘marriage of opposites’ between centralisation and decentralisation, to use an expression of 
Tarantelli (1986a: 216), emerges as the new compromise of the 1990s. Will it last or end in divorce?  
 
In this chapter, written as a reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s work, I intend to review the development of wage 
bargaining institutions in Europe since 1980 with that question in mind: has a new institutional compromise 
emerged in the field of collective bargaining over wages, mixing the advantages of coordination and 
decentralisation, or is the current situation unstable and should we expect a disintegration of centralising 
institutions?   
 
I this review I limit myself to a part of Europe and cover developments during the past quarter century in 
fourteen countries - four from the North (Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark), five from the Centre 
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium), two from the West (Britain and Ireland), and 
three from the South (France, Spain and Italy). These countries reflect considerable variation in state traditions 
in industrial relations (Crouch, 1993), economic coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and welfare state 
development (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The exclusion of the new democracies and transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe can be defended on the ground that there the issue is a different one: not change 
but creation of wage bargaining institutions based on democratic organisation, class conflict and market rules. 
Moreover, we do not have comparable data for these 25 years and the data that we have should be evaluated 
from a different perspective.  
 
The second limitation is the restriction to wage bargaining institutions and the role of trade unions. I leave 
aside social and employment protection, training and skill-supply, product market and corporate governance 
institutions and policies, all of which are important in the final analysis. I impose this limit because the topic is 
already very complex, it fits best what I know, and – last and least - wage bargaining institutions were focal in 
Tarantelli’s analysis. Employers’ policies will be considered in the final part where I analyse stability and change.  
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The chapter is divided in three parts. Part 1 begins with restating Tarantelli’s approach to macroeconomic 
stabilisation and the role of wage bargaining institutions. Next, I discuss the patterns and variation in the 
institutional make-up of wage bargaining since 1980. In the final part, I discuss the stability of Tarantelli’s 
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1. TARANTELLI’S FIRST-BEST AND SECOND-BEST APPROACH      
 
At home and abroad, Ezio Tarantelli participated passionately in the debate over wage bargaining, 
unemployment and inflation.2 He judged the OECD strategy second best, though probably unavoidable under 
conditions of high inflation and decentralised wage bargaining. When wage bargainers are unable or unwilling 
to voluntarily restrain wages, inflationary expectations can only be broken by a monetary cure creating higher 
unemployment  (Tarantelli, 1986a: 52). However, the first best strategy, because less costly for employment, is 
based on a negotiated announcement by the unions, agreed with the government and with employers, to 
lower wage increases, thus breaking inflationary expectations and allowing monetary authorities to support 
growth. This strategy is however only available if the unions find the will to use wages as a target for inflation, 
rather than the other way around, if the system of setting wages is sufficiently centralised to prevent free 
riding, and if there is also an accepted and efficient system of settling disputes (Tarantelli, 1986b).3      
    
Oddly, Tarantelli lobbied tirelessly in favour of a negotiated incomes policy among policy makers and union 
leaders in his own country, in spite of Italy’s low rating on any of the institutional conditions associated with 
his first-best strategy. The story has been told elsewhere (Fiorito, 2003; Brandolini et al, 2005). He wanted the 
unions to understand that they were key to bringing down high inflation – at one point, in 1980, running at 
over 20 per cent! – by non-monetarist means, by accepting the replacement of the ‘backward looking’ 
automatic indexation of wages to prices (‘scala mobile’) by a ‘pre-determined pay rise’ which then could guide 
economic agents’ expectations about future price developments. His ideas inspired the Social Pact (‘Lodo 
Scotti’) of January 1983 and the failed central agreement and government decree of February 1984. Outside 
Italy, the idea of a ‘pre-determined’ inflation target was picked up by policy makers in France and Spain. In Italy, 
Tarantelli’s ideas resonated in the central agreement of July 1992, which abolished indexation, and the ‘Scampi 
Pact’ of July 1993, which revised the Italian bipolar system of collective bargaining into a two-tier system with a 
hierarchy between industry and company bargaining.  
                                                  
2 He took part in another OECD expert conferenc, Collective Bargaining and Economic Policies: Dialogue and Consensus, Paris, 18-
20 July 2003, for which he wrote a contribution a version of which appeared in Laboratorio politico, a journal of the Communist 
Left. In it he defended his ‘first best’ approach to disinflation by way of a negotiated incomes policy. 
3 What is first- or second-best depends on the actor’s perspective and preference. Tarantelli took a public policy perspective 
with a strong but conditional preference for full employment. His first-best strategy, a negotiated income policy, is probably 
second-best for the unions because of the concessions involved, the uncertainty of the future payoffs, and the zorgansational 
strain of convincing and disciplining their members. Their first-best strategy would have been an unconditional public policy 
commitment to full employment. 
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These explanations based on what were emergency conditions could not but raise doubts regarding the stability 
of the institutional solutions of 1992/3. Will governments and employers remain interested in negotiated 
incomes policies and accept that unions be given a voice in decisions over key aspects of government policy 
once inflation has been beaten and the country is safely landed in the EMU?4 Will such policies survive an 
antagonistic government, disunity in the union movement, or a renewed outbreak of distributional conflict 
between employers and unions? How much and what type of institution building is necessary for sustainable, 
inflation-proof incomes-policies oriented towards goals such as growth, job creation and social cohesion? 
These questions are rather acute in the present situation in Italy, where macroeconomic policy making seems 
rather far removed from the ‘spirit’ of 1993 and the inflation disadvantage with Germany has cumulated to 12 
percentage points since entry in the EMU (ISTAT data, Corriere della Sera, 20 July 2005). Should we interpret 
Italy as a case where lessons about how to handle distributional conflicts were learned the hard way, but have 
since been forgotten?  
 
In Tarantelli’s view three institutions were required for a negotiated incomes policy: the capacity and 
willingness of unions to enter into cooperative solutions with employers and/or governments; the capacity of 
central organisations to prevent or repress free riding of local and sectional actors; and mechanisms for 
settling or containing distributive conflict (Tarantelli, 1986a: 76-9). Although there were occasional attempts to 
reach a cooperative solution, for instance during the government of National Unity (1976-78) and again in 
1983-84, they never lasted very long and were contested in both the political and industrial arena. Marino 
Regini has shown that the combination of poor delivery on promises and the inability to manage the resulting 
representation crises, compounded by political rivalry and organisational fragmentation in the Italian and 
British union movement, proved deadly for such experiments of ‘political exchange’ in Italy and the United 
Kingdom (Regini, 1984).  
 
On all dimensions – centralisation; union concentration; coordination and concertation –Italy was always 
ranked at or near the bottom of the various indicators of corporatism (Table 1). Colin Crouch argues that “a 
strategy of neo-corporatist concertation is available only where labour market organizations – unions and 
                                                  
4 Fiorito (2003: 294) answers ‘no’ and argues that it is the ‘paradox of corporatism’ that once it has done the job of driving 
inflation from the expectations of economic agents, centralised bargaining and neo-corporatist concertation become 
unnecessary and its costs more conspicuous. Hancké and Rhodes (2005) defend the thesis that in the post-EMU situation 
incomes policy pacts are no longer necessary and therefore no longer the priority of governments and employers if wage 
setting is sufficiently articulated in industry- and company-based policies of skill-formation and productivity-development.     
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employers’ associations – are capable of centrally coordinated action and are under pressure to do so without 
externalising costs which have to be born in making adjustments” (Crouch,2000: 279). If correct, then there 
was no place for such a strategy in Italy.   
Table 1 is based on a comparison of different rankings of union centralisation, bargaining coordination and 
corporatism that I did some years ago for the ILO (Visser, 2001a). These studies cover the 1970s and early 
1980s, the time of Tarantelli’s engagement in the debate. They tell us what international scholars thought 
where Italy stood when its adventures with a negotiated incomes policy began. I have adjusted the rankings in 
the original study to 12 countries in this chapter (all except Ireland and Spain, for which no or too few 
rankings exist). 
 
There is little disagreement among scholars about the extremes: Austria and Sweden are always at or near the 
top; Italy, France and the UK always at or near the bottom. As one can see from Tarantelli’s own ranking (in 
column 7), he shared an international opinion about the absence of the institutions for neo-corporatist 
incomes policy in Italy. His ranking gave much weight to cooperation and conflict resolution, behavioural 
features that later, in a seminal contribution of David Soskice (1990), were featured as coordination rather 
than centralisation. It is therefore hardly surprising that Tarantelli put Austria, Germany and Japan (he did not  
consider Switzerland) before the three Scandinavian countries.5 As shown by the larger coefficient of variation 
across rankings, there is more doubt among scholars about the position of Germany and the Netherlands. The 
ranking of these countries depends very strongly on which dimension is being considered: organisational 
cohesion; centralisation within organisations (unions); bargaining coordination; conflict resolution or political 
concertation.  
 
Lane Kenworthy (2001) has done a marvellous job in reviewing these ‘first generation’ indicators of wage 
setting and criticised their rather impressionistic nature, time invariance and mixing up of different dimensions 
of agency, behaviour and structure. He gives a much better press to some of the newer ‘second generation’  
                                                  
5 Unfortunately, Soskice’s scores on ‘economy-wide coordination’ (Soskice, 1990: 55) included too few of the countries of 
this chapter to be represented in Table 1. He put Japan, Austria and Switzerland, but not Germany, before Norway and 
Sweden (and did not include Denmark, Finland or Ireland). Soskice emphasised employers’ behaviour, whereas Tarantelli, 
like most scholars at that time, focused almost exclusively on trade unions. How this caused their different ranking of 
Germany is unclear. In international studies covering all OECD countries, the ranking of Japan, Germany, Switzerland and 
the Netherlands proved most unstable (Siaroff, 2001). 
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studies, based on more conceptual and measurement precision, as well as capturing some of the variation over 
time. These studies include the measures of union centralisation of Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (1999), the 
index of bargaining centralisation of Iversen (1999), the measures of centralisation and coordination of wage 
bargaining of Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001), and Kenworthy’s own scale for measuring bargaining 
coordination, now also reflected in recent work of the OECD (2004) and the European Commission (Visser, 
2004).  
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2. WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS 
 
Inspired by comparative studies such as Bruno and Sachs (1985), Tarantelli (1986b) and Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988), we now have hundred or more studies of wage bargaining institutions (“corporatism’) and socio-
economic performance. For recent overviews I refer to Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Calmfors et al. 2001; EC, 
2005; Flanagan, 1999; 2003; OECD, 2004; Traxler et al., 2001. The results are somewhat disappointing, 
however:  
-  Union density (or coverage), taken as a proxy for union bargaining power, tends to be associated with 
higher levels of unemployment and wages, or is insignificant. 
-  The impact of bargaining centralisation is unstable and depends strongly on which countries are 
included, how centralisation is measured and what other institutions and policies are taken into 
consideration. 
-  The effects of centralised and intermediate-level (sectoral) bargaining tend to depend on the type of 
monetary policy, with sectoral bargaining producing more restraint if combined with a non-
accommodating monetary policy. 
-  How sectoral and firm-level bargaining perform relative to each other is unclear, with company 
bargaining producing more restraint if product markets are competitive and at low levels of union 
density. 
-  Bargaining coordination improves outcomes or mitigates the negative effects of high union density, but 
these effects are smaller in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the measures for coordination 
are rather crude and impressionistic. 
-  Studies focusing on the interaction between economic shocks and labour market institutions tend to 
confirm that high union density or bargaining coverage increase the probability that transitory effects of 
economic shocks will turn into persistent unemployment, whereas coordination tends to mitigate this 
effect (Blanchard and Wolffers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2003), but these results are unstable across studies 
(EC, 2005). 
-  Most studies agree (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 1999; Iversen, 1999; OECD, 1997, 2004; 
Rowthorn, 1992) that  unions tend to reduce wage inequality and that this compression effect is 
strongest in countries where union density and bargaining coverage are high, and bargaining is 
centralised or coordinated, but this has not been checked with recent data. Some authors suggest that 
this has worsened the already dim employment opportunities of people with few skills, but this has not 
been tested in rigorous analysis (OECD, 2004: 141-2).   
 
Bob Flanagan (2003: 178) notes that the “sensitivity of empirical results to small changes in the institutional 
characterization of a small sample of industrialized countries is a disturbing characteristic of much of the 
literature”. Results depend very strongly on which countries, variables and years are included, and there is 
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large scope for measurement error and omitted variables. In a recent evaluation of ten years Jobs Strategy, the 
OECD (2004: 133) admits that “the overall fragility of the evidence linking collective bargaining to 
macroeconomic performance suggest that great caution should be exercised when attempting to draw 
guidance for making policy choices from this research”.6 This caution also regards the use of indicators, many 
of which, according to Flanagan (1999: 1172), “ do not measure the concepts stressed by theory”. He is most 
critical of the composite and often ill-defined index of corporatism, because one can never be sure which part 
of the index drives the action in a correlation.  
 
The key debate of recent years concerns the difference between centralisation and coordination. Whilst 
centralisation refers to the level at which wage settlements are usually negotiated and to the enforceability of 
these agreements, coordination reflects the degree to which pay negotiations conducted in different bargaining 
units are synchronised and take into account the effects on each other and on the economy as a whole. While 
centralisation has been equalled with formal structures, organisational hierarchies and legal rules, coordination 
is often associated with softer forms of guidance and influence. As is pointed out by Kenworthy (2001), 
coordination is fundamentally a behavioural concept, whilst centralisation is rather a structural property of the 
system. This creates two difficulties for designing and measuring an index of coordination.  
 
Firstly, bargaining coordination can be generated by qualitatively rather different arrangements and its ranking 
is therefore far from straightforward. Franz Traxler and his colleagues (2001: 117) list three modes of 
‘voluntary’ coordination, e.g. inter-associational; intra-associational and pattern setting, and two modes in 
which the state plays a direct (‘state-imposed’) or indirect (‘state-sponsored’) role. The case of direct state 
intervention is rather special. Traxler et al. (2001: .297) observe that intervention is most frequently 
associated with the failure of coordination by other means. This leaves four modes of voluntary coordination, 
however induced or motivated. In 2005 half of our 14 countries engaged in one or the other form of 
associational coordination, including pattern setting (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway), four rely on state-sponsored coordination and tripartism (Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, Italy); two 
on state-imposed coordination (Belgium and France), and one does without coordination of pay bargaining 
(United Kingdom) (see also Chart 1). Taking into consideration whether voluntary or sponsored coordination 
                                                  
6 Ten years before, with the launching of the Jobs Strategy, the OECD was less cautious and advised its members to encourage 
decentralisation and differentiation of wage bargaining in response to local conditions and skill differences; reduce the scope and 
level of minimum wages; abandon wage-to-price-indexation; and phase out the administrative extension of sectoral agreements 
(OECD, 1994). Member states had been reluctant to follow this advice, however, as was admitted in the first evaluation 
(OECD, 1999; see also Armingeon and Beyeler, 2004)   
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is supported by one or both sides (intra- or inter-associational), pattern setting is regular or irregular and 
covers all or part of the economy, it is possible to rank coordination on a scale from 1 to 5 (see Table 2). If 
the understanding of wage coordination is that it is a solution to the collective action problem of securing 
wage restraint against the temptation of free riding (Soskice, 1990), then both mutual assurances and relative 
size should matter.  
 
Secondly, since it is rather difficult to collect information on behavioural intentions and near to impossible to 
rank intentions across economies if we had such information (Kenworthy, 2001: 79), many authors, following 
Soskice, have ranked countries according to the observed degree of coordination of wage outcomes. The 
problem of that approach is that it tends to be rather subjective, difficult to verify and prone to measurement 
error, since it allows no control of the indicators independently of the behaviour observed.7 It would be 
possible to eradicate such subjectivism by taking the actual movement of wages as the basis for the measure of 
the degree of coordination, but that would make coordination as an explanatory institutional variable in the 
explanation of union behaviour useless because tautological (ibid.).  
In my coding of coordination, I combine data on the nature of the intra- or inter-associational relationships 
and the coverage of such relationships. Similarly,  I follow the mixed organisational approach, as suggested by 
Clegg (1976) and Windmuller (1975), combining information on the observed level of bargaining with data on 
the size and structure of bargaining units and agents, and the type and enforceability of agreements, strike 
controls and articulation of lower-level bargaining (Visser, 1990). Table 3 explicates my coding for the 14 
countries of this study from 1980 to 2003, taking into account three levels of bargaining: central, sectoral 
(and/or regional), and company (or establishment). Although relying on different – behavioural v. 
organizational – data, this mixed way of gauging coordination and centralisation produces highly comparable 
indexes. They measure the same property (the capacity and willingness of unions to coordinate wages) in 
different ways and can thus be used almost interchangeably.    8
 
Limiting myself to the role of unions and wage bargaining, I shall now review the five usual suspects: union 
density, bargaining coverage, union concentration, bargaining centralisation and coordination.   
                                                  
7 Kenworthy (2001: 77) notes that the Layard-Nickell-Jackmann (1991), Hall-Franzese (1999) and OECD (1997) coordination 
indicators “appear to follow Soskice’s measurement strategy, but it is difficult to know for certain because no explicit rationale 
is provided for their coding schemes. Plainly, there is potential for significant measurement error in such indicators”.  
8 Taking all years together, the Spearman correlation coefficient between my index of centralisation and coordination for the 14 
countries of this study is .88 and the main deviant case is Switzerland (low on union centralisation but relatively high on 
employer coordination).  
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First I clarify what I think these indicators stand for, then propose a measure and compare European labour 
markets during the past 25 years.  
 
2.1. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND DENSITY 
 
Union density, i.e. union membership relative to those eligible to join, is the commonly used measure for 
evaluating the position of trade unions in labour markets and society (Bain and Price, 1980). It indicates the 
regular support that unions are capable of mobilising in their key constituency of workers and salaried 
employees and thus measures the ‘associational power’ of Labour (Wright, 2000). There are several ways to 
gauge the extent of support for unions, e.g., financial contributions; willingness to fulfil tasks in the union and 
supply ‘unpaid’ labour; voting for union slates and candidates in workplace elections; public opinion data; 
participation in union strike calls, but membership sums up most of this and it is together with electoral data 
easiest to collect and compare. A large membership tends to bring organisational and financial independence, 
allows the payment of professional staff, and devote energy and ideas to causes that go beyond the survival of 
the organisation. It conveys to workers the self-assuring idea that they may count on others and supports the 
group sanctioning mechanism needed to uphold the norm of membership (Booth, 1985; Visser 2002).  
 
In most econometric treatments union density is taken as an indicator of union bargaining power or wage 
pushfullness (see: Flanagan, 1999). The idea is that the issuing of threats in bargaining games will be more 
credible when the identification with the union is strong and the pool of non-union workers or potential 
strikebreakers is small. However, as far back as early debates in French syndicalism, union leaders were aware 
that large memberships meant moderation.9 In his book Unions and Capitalism, Charles Lindblom makes the 
point that union size is a double-edged sword: it increases the bargaining power of unions but it also “makes 
obvious to all union leadership their actual responsibility for the welfare of the economy even if they do not 
wish to act responsible” (Lindblom, 1949: 196). Mancur Olson has popularised this point, arguing that large 
unions will be internally diverse and that their leaders will have organisational reasons to be prudent, because 
“the members of an encompassing union own so much of the society that they have an important incentive to 
be actively concerned about how productive it is; they are in the same position as a partner in a firm that has 
only a few partners” (Olson, 1982: 48), though he left doubt whether this was a blessing or a pain, suggesting 
                                                  
9 Albert Levy, treasurer (!) of the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), believed that it was better for unions to have 
fewer but highly motivated members, “car le lourde modération entre avec le grand nombre (cited in Visser 1989: 53).”  
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that large organisations may also slow down decision making and represent stronger veto power (see 
Schwerin, 1984).  
 
Peter Lange (1984) speculates that a large membership size gives workers more trust in the cooperation of 
fellow workers and thus enables “workers to extend the time-horizon over which they maximize by making 
them a bit more inclined to run the risk of paying costs in the present as part of conditional strategies 
intended to improve their own longer-term outcomes (Lange, 1984: 106).” Such trust would, in his view, be 
encouraged if the union used “mechanisms of verification”, like membership ballots and referendums that 
“allow workers throughout the union movement to gain some sense of how many of their fellow workers are 
inclined to cooperate (idem, 108).” In sum, union size not only enhances bargaining power but also increases 
the probability that the union exercises strategic capacity.10 Holden and Raum (1991) propose a model in 
which the incentive for bargaining coordination among employers increases with union density, reasoning that 
a larger union can potentially inflict more harm on firms. It is for this reason problematic to equal union 
density with wage pushfullness and we cannot make such predictions without taking into account the 
interaction with other variables, in particular union structure and coordination.  
 
We have now reasonably reliable and comparable union membership and density statistics, often from 
different (administrative and survey) sources.11 The union density rates in Table 4 (left panel) are calculated for 
employed workers and without retired workers, students, the self-employed and others without employee 
status, for this gives the best comparison with labour market and household survey data and the best index of 
the standing of the unions in the labour market.12 The picture that emerges is one of considerable and even 
increasing variation across countries amidst a general tendency of decline, in recent years also affecting unions in 
countries like Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Union decline is observed in both liberal, coordinated and mixed 
market economies, in countries with (Austria, Netherlands) and without (UK, France) corporatist features of 
organisation and policy-making, and in countries with (Ireland) and without (Germany) social pacts. This 
suggests that there is a rather general process behind this decline, which is endogenous to labour market 
changes (rise of service employment, fixed-term and part-time contracts, unemployment, outsourcing, 
                                                  
10 A union has strategic capacity if its actions have predictable and discernable effects on the welfare and actions of other actors 
(Iversen, 1999: 94) and no strategic capacity if its decisions are unaffected by others.  
11 See Visser (2006) and Visser, Tergeist and Martin (2004: http://www.oecd.org) for an overview of methods and sources, 
and annual figures from 1970-2001/2,  
12 In 2001, in these fourteen countries an average of 17 per cent of the total membership had retired from the labour market, 
1-2 per cent were self-employed and 7 per cent unemployed. These proportions vary across countries (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 
2000).   
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privatisation, etc.) but with a different timing, magnitude and impact across countries, and mediated by 
nationally differing institutions such as union involvement in the administration of unemployment insurance, 
union presence in the workplace and the recognition of trade unions by firms and in the national political 
arena (Checchi and Visser, 2005; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Western, 1997). 
 
Three more common developments are striking: the concentration of union membership in the public or 
publicly financed and regulated sector; the aging of union members; and feminisation. These three 
developments are found in all countries, but the concentration of union membership in the public sector is 
strongest where the decline of manufacturing employment and unionism has been very pronounced, as for 
instance in Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Female membership is strongly tied to the rise of services and 
new professions, partly overlapping with the public sector. Ageing is related to the instability of youth labour 
markets, education and later entry into the labour force and also the decline of industry and manual work.  
As was pointed out before, it is not possible to make general predictions for union wage behaviour on the 
basis of membership or density data. However, the decline in density tends to increase the uncertainty of 
unions and their dependence on the decisions and support of other actors in the political and industrial arena. 
Many unions and union federations are in financial dire straits and the central organisations in particular have 
been forced to scale down staff, finances and activities, with possible negative consequences for their 
coordinating role. Interlocutors may take continued membership decline as a sign that unions have become 
dispensable or may be more readily forced into concessions. If lower density rates and more dependence on 
others means less bargaining power, uncertainty may nonetheless produce more assertive policies and 
instability.  
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2.2. BARGAINING COVERAGE 
 
Bargaining coverage denotes the share of employed wage and salary earners whose terms of employment are 
affected by collective agreements negotiated between unions and employers. It is an indicator of the degree of 
joint regulation of labour markets (Traxler et al., 2001: 194). Collective agreements vary in regulatory effect 
(Clegg, 1976); some will affect only wage floors, others detail standard pay rates or do not have wage clause at 
all but only procedures stipulating how wages may be changed. Company agreements tend to be more 
detailed than industry agreements and industry agreements in Sweden are much more detailed than in France. 
The variation is quite endless and has further increased with the diffusion of ‘opening’, ‘hardship’, ‘opt-out’ and 
‘inability to pay’ clauses in sectoral agreements (see below). The common denominator of all these agreements 
is that they are procedural safety nets  and guarantee some degree of union control. Usually, collective 
agreements overrule individual employment contracts.  
 
We can measure bargaining coverage fully comparable with union density statistics as the share of employees 
working in firms covered by collective agreements. Measurement errors may stem from definitional problems 
(what is a contract?); double counting (especially problematic in the case of multi-level agreements); and 
registration failures (membership or agreements that have expired, or are only registered for the year when 
the agreement was reached). In general, coverage statistics are more problematic than membership statistics if 
only because the double check with survey data is less available (on an annual basis such data is now only 
available in the UK). Data based on household surveys is probably less reliable as workers may not know that 
they are covered, a problem that can be especially large in the case of industry-wide and pluri-annual 
agreements.13 Finally, coverage statistics must be adjusted and take out those sectors or groups that have no 
(legal) access to collective bargaining (for instance, civil servants, police, military) (Traxler, 1994).  
 
The coverage rates shown in Table 4 (right panel) should therefore be used with more caution than the union 
density rates and they are less detailed. In some countries, it is only possible to indicate the lower boundaries 
(OECD, 2004, Table 3.3).  In all countries coverage rates exceed density rates; in some countries (France, 
                                                  
13 According to Steen Scheuer, who conducted several surveys on union membership and contract coverage in Denmark, 
“there is a remarkable lack of interest in collective agreements” and “only few employees know or have read their own 
collective agreement” (Scheuer 2004: 99). 
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Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Belgium) by a wide margin.14 This reflects the greater 
extent of employer organisation in these countries and the possibility to extend union-negotiated agreements 
non-organised employers by public law (Traxler and Behrens, 2002). This data tell us something about the 
degree of recognition and support for union-negotiated employment contracts among employers and public 
policy makers, often based on rules and principles that cannot be changed without significant legal and political 
conflict. Bargaining coverage rates, therefore, proxy the degree of institutionalisation of collective bargaining and 
trade unions in labour markets. 
 
Unlike union density rates, bargaining coverage rates are remarkably stable and not trended downwards. This 
reflects the continuation of multi-employer bargaining, usually with an added layer of company bargaining. 
There are only three cases of decline: the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Germany. The UK and 
Switzerland are the only cases in which less than half of all employees are currently covered by collective 
bargaining. In the UK this is related to the collapse of multi-employer (sectoral) bargaining and employer 
organisation; in Switzerland more likely to the function loss of the sectoral agreement, which in many cases no 
longer contains a wage clause. In Germany the erosion is due to the withdrawal of small firms and those in 
Eastern Germany from employers associations and multi-employer agreements. Bargaining coverage in the 
private sector was more or less stable –around 70 per cent or more – in West Germany before unification 
and is currently estimated at 59 per cent in Western and 36 per cent in Eastern Germany according to the 
IAB Panel Database for 2004. However, half of these non-organised firms nonetheless orient themselves 
toward the sectoral agreement and follow its basic features on pay and working time. This pushes the German 
coverage rate up by 10-15 percentage points. This practice of applying the agreement ‘by invitation’ of the 
unions is quite widespread in Scandinavia and reflects the power of the unions to some extent. Such quasi-
voluntary wage following behaviour thus retains an element of coordination and confirms that firms may want 
more autonomy but nonetheless apply the union contract if that gains them an implicit ‘peace offer’ from the 
unions and lowers the risk of conflict. 
 
The standardised coverage rates shown in Table 4 are aggregated for agreements at all levels with an attempt 
to avoid double counting. In general coverage rates vary like union density rates: higher in the public sector 
(though some categories, like the military, the police or high ranking civil servants may be excluded); in large  
                                                  
14 There is hardly a correlation between the two measures. Taking all years together, the Spearman correlation coefficient 
between density and coverage rates in the 14 countries of this study is .28 and weakening over time. 
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firms; in older sectors (manufacturing, banking, etc.), among workers with stable contracts and those in 
manual occupations. The same variation is also generally found for the coverage of workplace representation 
and works councils. Bargaining coverage and works council coverage overlap to a great extent, but whilst 
collective agreements cover employees in small firms in the case of multi-employer bargaining, the law usually 
exempts small firms from the obligation to create a structure for employee representation and consultation. 
Where there is no bargaining, there are usually no councils either and works council hardly adds to the union 
coverage rate based on collective agreements. For instance, in Germany only between two and three per cent 
of the firms not covered by collective agreements had a works council in 2002. Together these firms 
employed some seven per cent of German employees (these included some large firms like IBM with an anti-
union policy.  
 
The importance of mandated and elected works councils as a second channel of representation in addition to 
the union lies in the internal extension of the agreements negotiated by the union, that is, in the legal mandate 
to monitor and apply legal and negotiated standards to all employees in the firm, including non-union 
members. In single channel representation, workplace representation is based on union membership and the 
extension of standards and rights to non-members may depend on their willingness to join the union. In actual 
practice, the differences tend to be small, however. Union-based councils in for instance Italy represent also 
non-members, whereas mandated councils in Germany or the Netherlands, elected by members en non-
members alike, tend to be highly unionised (Rogers and Streeck, 1995). Local union representatives and works 
councils have become increasingly important for the adjustment of sectoral agreements and additional 
company bargaining, even if the law formally denies them a role in pay bargaining. This development has taken 
place ‘beyond the law’ and is now formalised in delegation and opening clauses.  
 
2.3. UNION STRUCTURE AND CONCENTRATION 
 
Union structure defines the opportunity structure for competition and coalition building among trade unions 
and is an important element in predicting the possibilities of coordination and centralisation of union 
bargaining. The key indicator is concentration or the extent to which members are grouped in few large 
unions rather in numerous small ones. The argument that size matters draws on arguments that unions which 
encompass large chunks of the economy do not face the same incentives as small occupational, enterprise or 
even industry unions. Large unions cannot, like small unions or workplace representatives, expect to hide 
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behind others or externalise the costs of their actions.  
 
Union concentration can be approached in similar ways as economic concentration of firms or political 
parties, using the so-called Herfindahl-index which weights large unions more than small and denotes the 
probability that two randomly selected union members belong to the same organization (Iversen, 1999: 53; 
Visser, 1990: 172; Wallerstein and Western, 2000: 372).  In the political party literature the inverse of this 
index is called the ‘effective’ number of parties and by analogy we speak of the effective number of unions. 
Table 5 shows the changes in union concentration at the central (entire economy) and intermediate (sector) 
level: Npeaks refers to the effective number of peak associations or national union confederations (left panel); 
Naffiliates to the effective number of national unions affiliated with the largest confederation (middle panel); Nall to 
effective number of all unions by multiplying Npeaks x Naffiliates (right panel).  
 
The first number reflects the degree of unity in the labour movement and the dominance of a large central 
organisation and it also takes into account the share of unionised workers represented by unaffiliated unions 
or minority federations. It is a useful measure in assessing the degree of coordination if unions would 
negotiate wages or issue guidelines at the central level (across industries). There appears to be little variation 
over time, but across countries the differences are pronounced. There are four countries (Austria, Germany, 
the UK and Ireland) where most unions and union members find a common house, but in the other countries 
they are divided over two or more, or in one cases, France, many more peak associations. The decline of the 
traditional Social Democrat (and Communist) confederations, with manual and industrial membership, for 
instance in Scandinavia, Italy or France, is also reflected in these figures. They were in the past the main 
sponsors of wage coordination and their decline suggests that the organizational support for economy-wide 
coordination may have decreased. 
 
Moving one level down, we calculate the effective number of unions in similar ways. The effective number of 
unions affiliated with the largest confederation may be thought of as the effective number of bargaining units 
(Iversen, 1999: 53). It will be a reasonably accurate approximation of the number of bargaining agents if unions 
affiliated with different confederations but in the same firm or industry form cartels and bargain jointly. This is 
usually the case in Scandinavia (for unions representing different occupational groups), or in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy or Spain (for unions representing different political or religious orientations). If they do not, 
Nall will be the better measure and this applies to France in most years and sectors.   
At the intermediate or sectoral level, the main trend is towards union concentration. This is partly caused by 
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differing growth rates (the rise of the public service unions, the decline of manufacturing unions) but union 
mergers and take-overs of smaller unions play a big role as well. This tendency has been particularly 
pronounced in countries where membership has stagnated or declined (UK, Netherlands, Ireland, 
Switzerland). The new ‘conglomerate unions’ often straddle the borders of many industries and have become 
little peak associations themselves, internally diverse and with decentralised decision-making in matters of 
wage bargaining (Streeck and Visser, 1997). This implies that the assumption of one (effective) union = one 
bargaining unit is becoming less realistic.  
 
Cross-national differences in union concentration are massive but have narrowed – the UK is now much less 
an outlier than it once was when there were still hundreds of unions around. France beats all other countries 
in terms of union fragmentation, at some distance followed by Italy, Switzerland and Finland. Unions are most 
concentrated in Austria and Germany, in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. In some of these countries 
there is a large union trumping all others in size and bargaining influence. There appears to be no relationship 
between country size and union concentration, although there should be less space for viable sectoral 
specialisation in small countries and more pressure toward concentration.  
 
A large union may set a wage trend which other unions are only glad to follow. The union may then act as 
‘substitute peak association’ by assuming responsibility for the national economy or the export sector at large, 
as did the IG-Metall for many years in Germany (Streeck, 1994). Thus, concentration can be a substitute for 
centralisation (Golden, 1993; Visser, 1990; Wallerstein and Western, 2000), just as centralisation through 
federation building is a response to fragmentation stopping short of amalgamation or merger. For example, the 
strong powers and wide ranging tasks of the Norwegian labour federation LO have been associated with the 
large number of small unions spread out over a large territory, whereas the dominance of some very large 
unions in a much more concentrated space prevented such a development in the Danish LO (Galenson, 1949, 
1952). This may explain the weak association between centralisation and concentration, an empirical result 
that puzzled Traxler et al. (2001).15  
 
2.4. UNION BARGAINING CENTRALISATION 
 
Centralisation refers to the level(s) at which decisions are taken, and to the authority or enforceability of  
                                                  
15 Taking all years together, the Spearman correlation coefficient between my index of centralisation and concentration for the 
fourteen countries of this study is .51. 
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those decisions (Traxler et al., 2001; Visser 1990). A centralisation indicator should tell us how decisions 
taken by bargainers at any level are affected by decisions at one or more higher levels, or in the parlance of 
game theory how it changes the inside options or disagreement payoffs of bargainers at any level  
 (Naylor, 2003). This requires the consideration of both union structure and union authority. 
 
If each union would negotiates only one contract, if there would be no overlap in jurisdiction and all bargaining 
happened at one level, than centralisation equals concentration and is the inverse of the effective number of 
unions (Iversen, 1999: 53). However, this is not a realistic approximation of actual wage bargaining and the 
first point to consider is multi-level bargaining. If collective bargaining takes place at different levels, we need to 
assign a weight to each of these levels based on its importance for the overall outcome. In essence we need to 
know the number of levels and the authority vested in each level as it affects the next (lower) level(s). We can 
assign weights using information on the enforceability of agreements, strike control and actual participation of 
central organisations and union officials in bargaining processes at lower levels, as was done in Table 3. 
Enforceability depends upon the capacity of bargaining agents to implement the agreements they negotiate and 
presupposes a degree of control over the methods of conflict, for instance through the imposition of sanctions 
or the denial of support in case of conflict. This control need not and does not usually come entirely from 
within the union, but may be buttressed by employer sanctions and court action.  
 
The second point to consider is that at each level there is usually more than one bargaining agent or unit. It is 
at this point that we must combine our data on union concentration with the information on the relative 
importance of levels. This renders a measure of centralisation which reflects the relative weight of each level 
of bargaining and the concentration or fragmentation of bargaining units or agents at that level (Iversen, 1999: 
53).  
 
Studying the centralisation data in Table 6 (left panel), a decentralisation trend is observed in Scandinavia, very 
strongly in Sweden and to a lesser extent in Norway and Denmark. The Swedish bargaining system was unique 
in its degree of centralisation in 1980, but has now become quite average, close to Germany and Denmark. 
There are two countries in which wage bargaining has become more centralised in recent times: Ireland most 
definitely, but also in Finland. The cases of Belgium and the Netherlands are less clear-cut; in the Netherlands 
is it rather concentration (union mergers) that drives the action, in Belgium, however, central level bargaining 
as remained very prominent. Ireland and Belgium have now the most centralised systems of union wage 
bargaining, though each significantly lower than Sweden in 1980 (or the Netherlands in 1970). They are 
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followed by Austria, on account of central union power and monopoly to synchronise wage bargaining, then 
Finland and somewhat further down, the Netherlands and Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Spain and 
Italy. Finally, we have five countries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK) with little change 
since 1980, but at rather different levels of centralisation, and two (Spain and Italy) were there is much change 
but no clear trend covering these 25 years. In Spain, the wage pacts of the first half of the 1980s were 
followed by decentralisation and then some re-establishment of broadly aggregated sectoral bargaining with 
more discipline over the local level. In Italy the fragile pacts of the early 1980s were followed by a period of 
decentralisation, then a new period of central agreements and pact making, leading to the reform of sectoral 
bargaining with articulated company bargaining, but the re-appearance of conflict between the main union 
confederations and the relative decline of the largest confederation sets Italy on a downward trend in recent 
years.  
 
2.5. BARGAINING COORDINATION 
 
Coordination refers to the relationships between bargaining units or agents and the strength of such links. 
Coordination is based on relational networking, monitoring based on exchange of partly private information 
and reliance on collaborative rather than competitive relationships. Wage leadership and pattern setting are 
forms of indirect linking; cartels and single table bargaining and joint formulation and evaluation of demands 
constitute forms of direct linking or aggregation of bargaining units. Data on union concentration and union 
structure may help us to understand how and when coordination through direct and indirect linking is feasible. 
Thus, stable trend setting patterns will be observed only when there is a dominant union and a unitary or at 
any rate dominant peak federation. Cartels will be observed at intermediate levels of union confederations but 
only where political or ideological rivalry is muted.  
 
However, the increasing number of union takeovers and mergers that crosscut occupational and industry 
borders do no longer warrant the assumption that fewer unions means fewer bargaining units and less inter-
union disputes. In addition to data on union concentration we need therefore additional information on the 
demarcation of bargaining units, the existence of joint bargaining, the settlement of inter-union conflicts, and 
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 the coordination of bargaining within conglomerate unions16, in order to arrive at a meaningful institutional 
variable of union coordination in collective bargaining.  
 
Soskice tried to uncover the different mechanisms that helped explain observed wage outcomes. He argued 
correctly that the argument about centralisation and wage outcomes developed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
did not strictly depend on the level of bargaining but on the degree of coordination across bargaining units, 
and that only in the case of single-level bargaining at the central level, centralisation and coordination are the 
same. In decentralised or multi-level bargaining there may be other mechanisms, more or less formalised. No 
such mechanisms were hidden in the data on decentralised bargaining in the UK, but in other countries 
Soskice detected various examples: a strong monopoly on either side (Austria, Japan): pattern setting by large 
unions, employers or large firms (Germany, to a lesser extent in the Netherlands); employers control over 
conflict expression (Switzerland)), some pattern setting by the state combined with other means (France, 
Italy).  
                                                  
16 For instance, FNV-Bondgenoten, the largest private sector union, negotiates half of the 200 sectoral and two-thirds of the 800 
company agreements in the Netherlands. Each year issuing a report with its major demands, weighing data, evaluations and 
forecasts of the Central Planning Bureau, the government, the central federation, and the Social-Economic Council. The union 
coordinates not through synchronisation but by setting targets and defining joint agenda’s for its negotiators, allowing additional 
local issues to arise within a general approach to responsible wage development. Coordination is enhanced because negotiating 
union officials meet regularly, are appointed and can be moved to other tasks or districts, and all strike decisions are centralised. 
This example suggests that bargaining coordination without some degree of organisational centralisation may be rare.  
28   AIAS  -  UvA Wage bargaining institutions in Europe: a Happy Marriage or preparing for Divorce 
 
The coordination scores in Table 6 (right panel) follow those of Soskice, Kenworthy and the OECD presented 
in Table 2, with some modifications because I have tried to ignore the degree of state intervention, simply 
noting that in all recent cases of central bargaining state sponsorship and threats of intervention have been 
prominent (Visser, 2004: 45).  
 
About half of all EU Member States have maintained or re-introduced some form of explicit co-ordination at 
the national level. In Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands central-level coordination has occurred within the 
framework of tripartite cross-industry dialogue and agreements. The two-year national agreements in Belgium 
move within a framework set by law. In Denmark, sectoral agreements have since 2000 been supplemented by 
‘climate agreements’ between the social partners, a similar development occurred in 2004 in Sweden and in 
Spain central agreements have set guidelines for wage conduct since 2001. In Italy, finally, tripartite 
negotiations in 2002 and 2003 have mostly concentrated on labour law reform, but also sought to influence 
the inflation targets set by the government, but in this case there was a deep split between the union 
confederations. Almost all of these agreements recommend a policy of wage moderation in order to sustain 
non-inflationary economic development and to improve national competitiveness. Implicit coordination, 
through pattern following, has remained the main form of coordination in Austria and Germany. Finally, there 
was little apparent union or employer coordination in these matters in the UK and France.  
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3. WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE: HOW STABLE ARE 
THEY? 
 
From the quantitative overview in the preceding pages we get a picture of considerable stability. Union density 
is declining, but structures of collective representation and bargaining appear rather stable. Nearly three out of 
four workers are covered by collective bargaining and the British example of concentrating all bargaining at 
the company level has not received a following (with the partial exception of Switzerland). The trend towards 
decentralisation of wage setting is not general and often checked by increased union concentration and 
coordination with employers or within the union movement itself. All but two countries – or only one, the 
UK, if we disregard state-imposed coordination in France - have retained or regained a form of coordination 
above the level of firms.  
 
Two more observations are possible. In all (twelve) countries that have retained or even strengthened a form 
of central or sectoral wage bargaining or regulation, higher-level agreements or regulations have widened the 
scope for adjustment at the company level through general or conditional opening clauses under more or less 
control of national union representatives. But as important is the conclusion that all countries except Britain 
(and Switzerland) have tried to maintain, strengthen or return to some form of coordinated wage setting, sometimes 
reversing experiments with decentralised and uncoordinated bargaining. This does not, of course, mean that 
all countries have succeeded in raising the spectre of coordination. Some (e.g., France, Belgium) have resorted 
to pervasive and recurrent state intervention, with standardising and centralising effects that tend to conflict 
with other priorities, especially among employers. Others, like Germany or Sweden, have experienced that it 
is difficult to graft a tripartite practice on unions and employers steeped in autonomous bargaining.  
 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathy Thelen (2005) suggest that there is a fundamental asymmetry in these 
developments. Stepping up the degree of coordination in wage setting requires not only the willingness but 
also organisational and strategic capacities to overcome distributive conflict and collective action dilemmas. 
Decentralisation and non-cooperation are much less demanding and some of it may just happen by inaction 
and non-organisation. They identify several mechanisms for gradual yet transformative change, two of which are 
particularly relevant here: drift or neglect, when formal rules fall in disuse by not being updated, possibly 
because the actors cannot agree or mount the collective action required for maintenance and renewal; and 
layering, when new elements become added onto the old institution and then grow more rapidly, eventually 
changing the nature of the institution. The diffusion of opening clauses in sectoral agreements and re-
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assignment of bargaining rights to local representatives and works councils is an example of layering, just as 
the continuation of a practice of enforcing standardised agreements on an increasingly diverse community of 
firms and workers by legal and hierarchical means might be considered a lack of bringing existing institutions 
‘up to date’. Streeck and Thelen observe that neglect is often deliberate, just as layering may need active 
sponsors. Their key point is that the thresholds of collective action needed for an all-out attack on existing 
institutions or for their reform through negotiations with other actors tend to be much higher; hence, we will 
often see incremental change like drift and layering, which cumulatively and by stealth may result in a 
qualitative transformation.  
 
Given the weakening of the trade unions, we should expect that the institutional stability of collective 
bargaining, and in particular of the sectoral and national agreement, depends less than before upon the power 
of the unions and more upon the capacity and willingness of employers to continue joint bargaining. Sweden’s 
unions, with their exceptionally high membership levels, have been able to defend sectoral bargaining against 
the attack of some powerful employers, but they were forced to give up nationwide bargaining. The British 
case illustrates the more general point that collective bargaining structures and institutions above the level of 
firms become fragile when they rest solely on the power of unions even when unions are or appear strong, as 
was the case in the 1970s. Labour market institutions above the level of firms will be vulnerable even in the 
best of times, but especially when they do insufficiently address issues and problems of production, discipline, 
training and allocation important to employers (Thelen, 2001). Given their “low degree of control and an 
unrealistically narrow scope” (Brown, 1993: 190), sectoral agreements in Britain during the 1970 ‘s did nothing 
to help employers and made abandonment of multi-employer bargaining with the unions a rather costless 
option for them. Ending a “century-old tradition of official support for collective bargaining” (ibid.), Mrs. 
Thatcher gave this development a strong push in the direction of no bargaining.  
 
The German situation suggests a different dilemma. Here, sectoral bargaining institutions are highly 
institutionalised, shared between unions and employers, addressing both wage and non-wage issues, and their 
operation is nested in congenial institutions in the company, like the works council, board representation and 
codetermination (Streeck, 1992). However, there seems to have grown a conflict between actual or perceived 
regulatory tightness17 of the sectoral agreements and the size of the bargaining units, especially after unification 
                                                  
17 It may be that the rigidity of German collective agreements is a “carefully constructed myth” as is claimed by WSI-researches 
associated with the German unions, but if this is how German employers and politicians perceive them, and unions are unable 
to dispel such myths, they become part of reality. 
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(but perhaps even without it). When bargaining units are very large18 and cover large and small firms or 
regions with sharply different abilities to pay, the pressure to break down agreements in smaller units will 
inevitably rise. If decentralisation or differentiation is blocked and it is not possible to make bargaining units 
effectively smaller for a larger range of issues, employers with the lowest capacity to sustain the costs of such 
agreements will withdraw and coverage decreases. The conflict between the macro institution and micro 
behaviour becomes larger with the ‘uploading’ of sectoral agreements with ‘social policy’ and ‘work-family’ 
issues, two developments related to welfare  state retrenchment and EU regulation (Trampusch, 2004). Whilst 
small firms and weak sectors or regions might seem to benefit most from joint collective bargaining in terms 
of lower transaction costs and protection against union pressure, they are least capable to sustain the 
increasingly complex and costly qualitative or non-wage elements of the resulting agreements.  
 
One way out, it seems, is the customisation of agreements, offering more choice to individual companies and 
workers. Streeck and Rehder (2003), for instance, interpret the formalisation through ‘opening clauses’ of 
what began as an informal development of not applying the agreement, with or without the consent and 
knowledge of union representatives, as a (late) attempt at re-institutionalisation of the German system. 
Elsewhere, I have described such attempts at rescuing the sectoral agreement by giving up some of its defining 
characteristics as a process of ‘learning ahead of failure’ (Visser, 2001b). With the diffusion of ‘opt out’ and 
‘delegation’ clauses in sectoral agreements, firms gain the power, under certain conditions like the consent of 
the union or the works council, to suspend or selectively apply particular aspects of a legally binding sectoral 
agreement negotiated by their representatives. This may create the ‘marriage of opposites’ that employers 
seem to like – between on the one hand more autonomy in decision making over wages and working hours, 
reflecting different product and labour market constraints, and on the other hand a guarantee to keep 
distributional conflict out of the firm and retain the life-buoy of the sectoral agreement and consent of the 
union.  
 
How successful this strategy of institutional renewal – reviving the sectoral agreement by giving up some of its 
                                                  
18 Industry bargaining in Germany takes place at the regional (state) level, but these agreements are close copies of each other 
and regional variation is small. Contractual rates set for the former East German Länder are still lower than the national average, 
but differences have narrowed, as has been a consistent union objective since 1989.    
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 distinctive features – is hard to say. I hazard the prediction that much depends on whether or not the 
sectoral agreement remains relevant for wages and wage structures. A sectoral agreement without a wage 
clause will probably disintegrate, because well-organised union groups in more profitable companies will no 
longer have reasons to defend the sectoral agreement as an instrument to limit the competition arriving from 
the external labour market. Another major variable, it seems to me, is the strength of workplace 
representation and its integration in the union. Where representation is strong and integrated, unions can be 
more confident in accepting forms of decentralisation based on the loosening of the sectoral agreement.  
Where union workplace representation is fragile, does not reach many (small and medium-sized) firms, is not 
under full control of national unions or has fallen victim to competition between them, unions have more to 
fear from decentralisation.  
 
This discussion shows that bargaining institutions are both means and ends and cannot be treated as just 
exogenous, as is usually done in econometric exercises. The fight over institutions is never only a fight over 
social and economic outcomes. A lot of union behaviour would be quite inexplicable if we treated the union as 
a bargaining instrument for higher wages or some other utility function only, as Alan Flanders has reminded us. 
In addition to economic achievement unions stand for the attempt to regulate labour markets in such ways so 
as to free workers from “dependence on chance and arbitrary will of others” (Flanders, 1970: 240).  
 
Moreover, the fact that labour market institutions such as unions and collective bargaining are contested does 
not imply that it is always a zero-sum conflict. The contested character of these institutions does neither rule 
out cooperation between contending actors nor outcomes in which some employers promote and maintain 
equalizing industry standards negotiated with and enforced by the unions as a strategic entry barrier against 
other firms. In some economic accounts this is an efficiency loss and the basis for rent seeking (Williamson, 
1968), but that assumes that the market is already functioning efficiently. In Streeck’s theory of ‘beneficial 
constraints’ there is the possibility that joint industry standards work as incentive structures for firms and 
workers, motivating them to upgrade their technology and skills and enhance the product quality of the sector 
(Streeck, 1992). These incentives are weakened if the ‘external’ bargaining structure (across firms) discourages 
coordination and become undone if the ‘internal’ bargaining structure (within firms) allows inefficient 
employers to side with works councils and workers faced with job losses in their attempts to lower or 
disregard the industry’s wage and social standards on a massive scale. This requires that ‘regime’ or ‘institution 
shopping’ is restricted. A general ‘opt out’ to firms and workers, for instance allowing them to work very long 
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hours, diminish the incentive to firms to invest in a ‘short hours – high productivity- high wage  solution’ and is 
a sure guarantee that overtime will remain a “thriving institution” (Flanders, 1964) needed by firms to 
compensate for inefficient work practices and by workers to top up their meagre income. Bad institutions 
work like drugs, as the British experience with the general opt-out clause (art 18(1)b) of the European 
working time directive shows (Barnard et al., 2003). Having become used to long hours, many firms and 
workers cannot survive without them. 
 
This brings me to my final question?. How hard and binding must wage bargaining institutions be to be 
effective? Recent studies on wage bargaining tend to argue that the organizational and administrative 
centralization of wage bargaining are less important in achieving beneficial outcomes in wage policies than a 
cooperative mood of play, common understanding and trust among the major players (Calmfors et al., 2001; 
O’Donnell, 2001; Culpepper, 2004). There is little doubt that a common understanding of the situation and a 
co-operative mood plaid a role in the success of coordinated incomes policies in countries like Ireland, 
Denmark and the Netherlands and that such qualities help produce good results within any bargaining 
structure. A norm-based incomes policy, based on jointly elaborated facts and a common understanding of the 
situation, and rooted in joint experiences of and investments in cooperation, has undoubtedly better survival 
chances than where such conditions are absent. But it is unlikely that such normative commitments are 
sufficient, “unless the structure of pay-offs and surrounding conditions (...) are consistent with self-interest” 
(Lange 1984: 106).   
 
Among the surrounding conditions are the rules and regulations that cannot be negotiated, at least not in the 
short-run. The crux of an institution is its binding or obligatory character, embodying the legitimate expectation 
that actors follow certain rules also when it is not expedient and in their immediate advantage (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). The older corporatist literature predicated such rule-following behaviour on particular 
organisational characteristics, with a strong and probably unwarranted bias towards centralisation and 
hierarchical control (Baccaro 2003, for a critique). Thus, wage coordination was thought to be facilitated by 
organisational structures and practices that allowed the unions “to ‘insulate’ bargaining from particularist 
demands and ‘coerce’ their members to accept the terms of the bargain once reached” and helped them to 
prevent disruptive competition (Lange, 1984: 106). This approach was embedded in a view that union leaders, 
armed with professional advice and welcomed to the secrets and corridors of macroeconomic policy making, 
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would be stronger motivated to endorse long-term, national and ‘public-regarding’ goals than their members.19 
As Peter Lange (1984) pointed out, both the reformist (corporatist) and radical (Marxist) wing in the labour 
movement tended to share the view that members and local bargainers had to be forced or fooled into 
supporting a policy of restraint. Baccaro (2003) has criticised the corporatist writers for their failure to 
consider mechanisms of democratic deliberation, accountability and legitimacy within organisations such as 
unions. These mechanisms may provide alternative means for achieving the intra- en inter-organisational 
cohesion and coordination needed for concerted policy making, better adapted to the greater diversity of 
firms, labour markets and employment and life conditions, and to and enhanced capacity for decentralised 
decision making. Presumably, in a successful “marriage of opposites” one needs both: non-negotiable 
commitments and deliberation.  
                                                  
19 Mancur Olson (1982), too, made strong assumptions about the relationship between leaders and members in interest 
organisations like unions: in ‘exclusive groups’ and ‘distributional coalitions’ members are assumed to control the leaders, in 
‘encompassing organisations’ vice versa.  
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Table 1: Rankings of Centralisation, Co-ordination and Corporatism 
 




        corporatism
& unions 




  CoV. 
                 (1)    (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6)     (7) (8)       (9) (10) (11)
                        
                               
                                
                               
                                
                           
                               
                               
                              
                               
                                
                           
                               
                                 
                       
                                
     
Sweden  5 2 2 3 3 5 4 4 3 4,5 3,5 3 0,299
Finland  5 4,5 (8) 5 5 8 7 4 7 8 8 7 0,256
Norway  5 3 3 2 2 4 4 2 4 4,5 2 2 0,378
Denmark  7 4,5 6 4 4 7 4 4 5 7 5 5 0,247
 
Germany  8 7 4 6 6 2 2 8 6 2 7 6 0,450
Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,000
Switzerland  10 9 10 12 (9) 6 (7) 9 9 6 6 9 0,233
Netherlands  2 8 5 7 8 3 7 6 2 3 3,5 4 0,474
Belgium  3 6 (7) 8 7 9 9 7 8 9 9 8 0,243
 
France  9 12 12 9 10 11 10 10 10 11 11 10 0,099




12 10 12 0,089
 
UK  11,5 10 10,5 10 11 10 11 11 11 10 12 11 0,064
 
Columns: 
(1)   Schmitter, 1981: centralisation of unions, data 1970s. 
(2)   Cameron, 1984: centralisation and power of unions, data 1970s. 
(3)   Visser, 1990: centralisation and cohesion of unions, average. 1970-85 (ranks of Finland and Belgium added, based on same methodology. 
(4)   Calmfors and Driffill, 1988: centralisation and co-ordination of unions, data 1970s and 1980s. 
(5)   Blyth, 1979: centralisation of collective bargaining, data of 1970s. 
(6)   Bruno and Sachs, 1985: centralisation and co-ordination of unions and employers, data late 1970s.  
(7)   Tarantelli, 1986b: centralisation of bargaining, regulation of conflict, and degree of consensus, data 1970s. 
(8)   Schmitter, 1981: corporatism; centralisation, monopoly and involvement of unions, data 1970s. 
(9)   Lehmbruch, 1984: organisation of unions and involvement of unions in public policy formation, data 1970s. 
(10)  Crouch, 1985: corporatism; state and societal interaction, data 1970s and 1980s. 
(11)  Lijphart and Crepaz ,1991: corporatism and consociationalism, data 1980s. 
 
Source: adapted from Visser, 2001a
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Table 2: Bargaining coordination, unions and employers, 2000 or later 
 
Kenworthy and OECD  Soskice  Visser (revised from Traxler et al. 2001) 
circa 2000  circa 1990  2000-3 
1= fragmented company bargaining (UK)  1= zero employer, union or government 
coordination (UK) 
1=no coordination (UK) 
  
1,5 = tacit government coordination 
through large firms (FR) 
 
1,5 intra-organisational, one sided (unions or employers), 
low coverage 
 
2= company and sector bargaining, unarticulated, 
weak government coordination (FR)
 
2= informal coordination, mostly within 
employers camp, some role unions (IT) 
 
2= informal, one-sided, high coverage (FR) 
 
2,5=intra-organisational, both sides, low coverage, irregular 
pattern setting 
 
3 =sector bargaining, irregular pattern setting, 
moderate coordination major players (SE, ES), (Kenw. 
also: DK, IT) 
3= informal coordination, large firms and 
employers, medium role unions (NL) 
3= irregular pattern setting, high coverage and monopoly 
(IT, ES), or regular pattern setting and low coverage and 
monopoly (CH) 
  
3,5= strong inter-industry coordination, 
strong role employers, medium to strong 
role unions (DE) 
 
3,5= intra-organisational, both sides, high coverage and 
monopoly, regular pattern setting (DE, SE, DK) 
 
 
4= coordination centralised and powerful 
employers organitations and/or unions (SE, 
NO, CH)  
 
4 = inter-organisational coordination in preparing 
negotiations or issuing guidelines (AT, NL) 
 
4= sector bargaining, regular pattern setting, intra-
peak coordination, government intervention, 
central agreements w/o peace clause (AT, DE, CH, 
BE, NL, EI), (OECD also DK, IT) (Kenw. also FI, 
NO)  
  4,5= inter-organisational coordination with binding 
agreements, medium to low coverage and monopoly one 
side (FI, NO, BE, EI) 
 
5 = central bargaining with peace obligation, and/or 
government imposition and/or intra-peak 
coordination with full union monopoly (OECD: FI, 
N, and (half the time) B). 
 
5=all encompassing union (AT) or 
employers, with pliant unions (JA) 
 
5= inter-organisational coordination, with binding 
agreements, medium to high coverage and monopoly both 
sides (SE in 1980) 
Sources: Visser, 2004; Kenworthy, 2001; OECD, 2004; Soskice, 1990; Traxler et al. 2001. 
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Table 3: Wage bargaining: levels, enforcement, conflict control and articulation, by country and year: 1980-2003 
 
weights        description country years
(a) (b)       (c)  
1.0 
 
.0   
      
      
     
     
     
     
     
      
     
      
     
      
     
      
      
.0
 
confederation(s) monopolize wage bargaining, agreements are enforced 
confederal control over strike decisions 











.2  confederation(s) negotiate (or implement) enforceable central agreement  
confederal control over strike decisions 




1980-82; 1985-86, 1989-90 
 
 
.5 .3 .2 confederation(s) negotiate central agreements with some enforceability  
industrial unions conduct wage bargaining within limits 




1981-82, 1984-88, 1990, 1996-99, 01- 
2002-4 
1980, 1983, 1985, 1996-97, 03  
   
.5 .0 .5 confederation(s) negotiate central agreements with some enforceability (or, failing that, defer 
to state intervention)  
industrial and local unions conduct wage bargaining within limits 









   
.2 .6 .2 confederation(s) negotiate non-enforceable central agreement, set targets and/or 
synchronise claims 
industry unions conduct bargaining, agreements are enforceable 






1981-82, 1984, 1986-87. 
 
.2 .4 .4 confederation(s) negotiate non-enforceable central agreement, set targets and/or 
synchronise claims 
industry unions conduct bargaining, with general opening clauses 










1983-84, 1987-88, 1991-92 
 
.1 .7 2 minor involvement confederation(s) (claims, ballots, strike control) 
industry unions conduct bargaining, agreements are enforceable 








.1 .5 4 minor involvement confederation(s) (claims, ballots, strike control) 
industry unions conduct bargaining, with general opening bargaining 

















       
      
description country years
(a) (b) (c)  
.1   
      
         
      
     
     
     
      
     
.0 9  minor involvement confederation(s) in bargaining (ballots, strike control) 
unclear hierarchy between industry and local bargaining 








.0 .9 .1 no involvement or control confederation(s) 
industry union monopolise bargaining, agreements are enforceable 
control over local strike decisions 
Germany 1980-1997
 
.0 .7 .3 no involvement or control confederation(s) 
industry unions conduct bargaining with room for local bargaining (or local bargaining 
dominates but strictly under peace obligation and mediation rules), agreements are 











.0 .3 .7 no involvement or control confederation(s) 
unclear or unstable hierarchy between industry and local bargaining, agreements are not 











Weights: (a) central level (entire economy or private sector); (b) sectoral or industrial branch level; (c) company or establishment level 
Source: Visser, own data, database of wage bargaining process, agreements and organisational data 1980-2003.  
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Table 4: Union density and bargaining coverage 1980-2003 
 
  Union density  employer density b) bargaining coverage rate 
           
                 
1980-3 1990-3 2000-3 trend    2000-3    1980-3    1990-3 2000-3 trend
 
Sweden  79               
         
               
               
           
           
             
               
               
               
           
                
               
               
           
               
               
           
                  
82 78 stable?  55   80+ 83   92** up 
Finland  69 76 74 stable?  60   95   95  95*   stable 
Norway  58 58 53 down  55   70+ 75 75** stable 
Denmark  80 76 72 down  52   70+ 73 76** stable 
       
Germany**  35a 31a/34 24 down  63   70+ 70+* 60+*/**  down 
Austria  55 45 36 down  100c)   98 98 98* stable 
Switzerland  30 23 18 down  40   50+ 50+ 40+ down 
Netherlands  33 25 23 down  85   85 82 86* stable 
Belgium  53 54 56 stable  72   95 95 95* stable 
       
France  18 10 8 down  74   85 92 95* up 
Spain  9 15 16 up  70   60+ 70+ 80+* up 
Italy  48 39 34 down  51   80+ 80+ 80+* stable 
       
UK  49 38 29 down  40   71 47 35 down 
Ireland 
56 50 36 down  60
 





mean  48 45 40 down 41   77 76 74 stable
st.dev.  (21.1)                (22.8) (23.1)   (22.8)   (11.1) (14.5) (18.0)  
Adjusted rates (see text);  
  a)  West Germany; b) private sector; c) compulsory membership 
    *  Including non-organized firms bound by agreements through administrative extension (France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany; and Austria through compulsory 
membership) or court decisions (Italy) 
**  Including non organized firms not bound by a sectoral agreement but nonetheless applying the agreement (Sweden, Denmark, Germany).    
Sources: Union membership and density: own data; employer density: Visser, 2006; bargaining coverage: EC, 2004; national reports (EIROnline); OECD, 2004; for Denmark 2000-3: Scheuer (2004); for Germany, 
recent years (1995-): IAB and WSI data. 
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Table 5: Union concentration – across and within industries, 1980-2003 
 
  central level    intermediate (sectoral level 
 
effective number of  
confederations  
effective number of unions 
(largest confederation) 
  effective number of unions 
(all confederations) 
                 1980-3 1990-3 2000-3 1980-3  1990-3  2000-3   1980-3 1990-3 2000-3
                    
Sweden 
2,2                  
                 
                 
                   
               
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
               
                 
                  
                  
               
                 
                  
               
                    
2,2 2,4 7 6 6
 
16 14 15
Finland  2,3 2,8 2,8 12 11 10   27 30 27
Norway  2,1 2,6 3,1 12 8 7   25 20 22
Denmark  1,9 2,0 2,0 ` 7 8 7   14 15 14
   
Germany  1,5 1,5 1,4 6 6 6   9 9 8
Austria  1,0 1,0 1,0 9 9 8   9 9 8
Switzerland  4,1 4,3 4,8 6 6 6   25 26 28
Netherlands  2,5 2,4 2,0 9 6 4   23 15 7
Belgium  2,3 2,3 2,3 9 10 10   21 24 22
   
France  5,6 7,1 6,1 10 8 8   56 59 51
Spain  2,6 2,8 2,7 8 9 8   22 26 21
Italy  3,1 3,4 3,5 9 10 10   29 32 34
   
UK  1,3 1,5 1,4 17 15 11   22 21 15
Ireland  1,2 1,1 1,1 6 5 4   7 5 4
   
mean 2,4 2,6 2,6 9,1 8,2 7,4   21,7 21,7 19,8
st.dev                     (1,2) (1,6) (1,4) (2,9) (2,5) (2,2)   (12,0) (13,5) (12,5)
 
Source: J. Visser (calculated from Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, CD-Rom, with updates for 2000-2003).  
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Table 6: Union centralization and bargaining coordination , 1980-2003 
   
  CENTRALISATION (indicator Iversen revised)    COORDINATION (indicator Kenworthy revised) 
  1980-3        1990-3 2000-3 change   1980-3        1990-3 2000-3 change
              
Sweden  66             
             
             
             
         
             
             
             
             
             
         
             
             
             
         
             
             
         
                  
48 35 down  5 4 3,5 down  
Finland  44 35 50 up  4 3,5 5 up 
Norway  46 36 41 down  4,5 4 4 stable  
Denmark  41 38 37 down  3 3,5 4 up? 
     
Germany  38 39 36 stable  4 4 4 stable 
Austria  52 52 51 stable  4 4 4 stable 
Switzerland  22 22 21 stable  3 3 3 stable 
Netherlands  34 42 45 up  3,5 4 4 up? 
Belgium  46 56 56 up  3,5 4 4,5 up 
     
France  16 15 16 stable  2 2 2 stable 
Spain  43 16 31 variable  4 2 3 variable 
Italy  42 38 28 variable  2,5 3,5 3 variable 
     
UK  12 12 13 stable  1 1 1 stable 
Ireland  28 55 56 up  2,5 4,5 4,5 up  
     
mean 38 36 37 3,3 3,3 3,4
st.dev                   (14,4) (14,8) (14,1) (1,2) (1,0) (1,1)
 
Source: Visser, own data, see text; and Table 3 (for centralisation) and Table 2 (for coordination) 
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